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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                
No. 05-3585
                                
BETTY J. BLUE,
                Appellant
   v.
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY,
DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CTR.
DLA/DSCP
                                                                              
On appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 04-cv-2210)
District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam, Sr.
                                                                                
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 22, 2006
BEFORE: McKEE, FUENTES and NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: May 24, 2006)
                                                  
OPINION OF THE COURT
                                                    
PER CURIAM
Betty J. Blue filed this Title VII employment discrimination action pro se, alleging
that her employer, Defense Logistics Agency / Defense Personnel Support Center (“DLA/
1DLA/ DPSC is a buying activity of the Department of Defense, which purchases
clothing, medical supplies, food and other items for the United States’ military world
wide. 
DPSC”)1, discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex.  At the time she filed
her administrative complaint with the EEOC, Blue, who is African-American, was a
Contract Specialist GS-11 and had worked for DLA/ DPSC for over twenty years.   In her
complaint, Blue alleges that she responded to a job announcement for a Contract
Specialist GS-12 in March 1999, and that, despite her qualifications, she was not selected
after her interview.  Blue also seeks class certification to represent 500 African-American
women employees of DLA/ DPSC occupying positions graded as GS-6 through GS-12.  
The District Court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
Blue had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, because
she presented no evidence that non-class members in substantially similar situations were
promoted.  Blue filed a motion for reconsideration of that order, which the District Court
denied.  Blue timely filed this appeal from both of the District Court’s orders, again
proceeding pro se.  In her brief on appeal, Blue raises four issues, which we will address
in turn.
Blue first challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellee.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply
the same legal standard used by the District Court, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.  See Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1999).  After reviewing the
record, we agree with the District Court that Blue has not made out a prima facie case of
discrimination and that Appellee thus was entitled to summary judgment.  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  Title VII’s protections were extended to federal government
employees in 1972 by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.  Title VII
is the exclusive remedy for federal employees bringing employment discrimination
claims.  Brown v. Gen. Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976).  In order to show
discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-53 (1981).  To establish a prima facie case for discriminatory non-promotion
using indirect evidence, a plaintiff must show that she is a member of protected class; that
she was qualified for, applied for, and rejected for a position; and that non-members of
the protected class were treated more favorably.  See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted).   If the employee plaintiff cannot make this showing, the
employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc.,
191 F.3d 344, 352 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).  
We agree with the District Court that, although Blue fulfills the first two
requirements for a prima facie case, as she is a member of a protected class and she was
2Blue is not required to demonstrate that the position she sought was filled by a
non-class member in order to establish a prima facie case  See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 352. 
See also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996). 
Therefore, contrary to Appellee’s argument and the District Court’s implication, Blue’s
statement that one of the selectees for the position was a “Black female,” while not
supportive of her claim, is not dispositive on the question of discrimination.
not promoted to a position for which she was qualified, she has not provided sufficient
facts to meet the third requirement of the test – that similarly situated non-class members
were treated more favorably.2  Blue thus has failed to establish the required “causal nexus
between [her] membership in a protected class and the decision not to [promote her].” 
See Santullo v. United States Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003). 
In support of her summary judgment motion, Blue submitted excerpts from a
presentation made at the NAACP Federal Sector Task Force Breakfast in October 1998,
which included statistics related to the overall racial composition of the workforce at
DLA/ DSCP in the 1990's.  Although statistical evidence can be used to prove
employment discrimination, it is not irrefutable, and its usefulness “depends on all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.”  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339-40 (1977).  In order to be useful in establishing a prima facie case, statistics
must assist the plaintiff in proving discrimination in her particular case.  Krodel v. Young,
748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
The statistical reports in Blue’s pleadings do not refer to the particular Contract
Specialist position she applied for in 1999.  Neither do they show the racial or gender
composition of the applicant pool or the race or gender of the successful applicants for the
position.  Blue’s statistics are too general to be relevant or useful in establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.  See e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983
F.2d 509, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1992) (statistical evidence too general to establish pretext);
Molthan v. Temple Univ. of Com. System of Higher Educ., 778 F.2d 955, 963 (3d Cir.
1985) (same).  In sum, Blue’s evidence does not create an inference that her non-selection
in 1999 was based on a discriminatory reason.  See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358.
Blue’s second challenge on appeal is to the District Court’s denial of class
certification.  We review a decision granting or denying class certification for abuse of 
discretion.  In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 143 ( 3d Cir. 2001).  An abuse of
discretion is found if the District Court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In re
General Motors Corp. Pick Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted).  Although a court should be cautious in
making a class certification decision based on its own impression of the merits of a case,
some inquiry into the factual and legal issues underlying a plaintiff’s cause of action is
usually necessary.  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
166-67 (3d Cir. 2001).
Four prerequisites must be met to obtain certification of a class: 1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class; 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  A district
court can only certify a class if all four requirements of Rule 23(a) are met.  In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F.3d 283, 308-09 (3d Cir.
1998).
We agree with the District Court that Blue cannot fulfill the requirements of Rule
23(a).  Even if we were to accept Blue’s argument that the first three requirements
(numerosity, commonality, and typicality) are met, as a pro se plaintiff, she cannot
adequately represent the interests of other class members.  See Fymbo v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000).  See also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v.
United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a pro se litigant may not
appear as an attorney for others).  We further note that, even if Blue were represented by
an attorney, she would not “possess the same interests and suffer the same injury” as the
class she purports to represent, because she, herself, has not made a prima facie showing
of discrimination.  See East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395, 403-04 (1977).  We agree with the District Court that it would be unfair to bind all of
the potential class members to the outcome of Blue’s case and, therefore, find no abuse of
discretion in the District Court’s denial of class certification. 
Blue next challenges the District Court’s amendment of the caption of her
complaint by replacing “Defense Logistics Agency/ Defense Personnel Support Center”
with “Secretary of the Department of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld,” as the sole
defendant.  The relevant statutory provision governing Title VII suits against the federal
government requires that “the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate,
shall be the defendant.”  See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c).  Blue argues that the caption
change was erroneous, because her employer, Defense Logistics Agency, is the entity
which allegedly engaged in the discriminatory conduct.  Appellee argues that Donald
Rumsfeld, as head of the Department of Defense, is the proper defendant.  On its face, the
statute accommodates both parties’ interpretations, as it allows for the head of a
department (such as the Department of Defense) or agency (such as Defense Logistics
Agency) to be named as the defendant.  We note that Blue’s interpretation enjoys some
support.  See e.g., Adams v. E.E.O.C., 932 F.Supp. 660, 664 n.3 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (Director
of Defense Logistics Agency was the only proper defendant in a Title VII action);
Williams v. McCausland, 791 F.Supp. 992, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same).  We need not
delve more deeply into this issue, however, as we conclude that the caption change was
neither an abuse of discretion nor relevant to the outcome of Blue’s case.
Blue also challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration.
We review this order for abuse of discretion.  See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).  The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.  See id.  The
District Court properly denied Blue’s motion.  We agree that, aside from her new
argument that the cases cited by Appellee were invalid because they were “antiquated,”
Blue’s motion did nothing more than restate her previous arguments.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment entered by the District Court.
